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This paper models voters' preferences over central versus local education policies
when there are private alternatives. Education is ¯nanced by income taxes and
individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are chosen by
majority vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may bene¯t the rich
and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised education. The model is also
extended to include peer e®ects. Peer e®ects increase the support for central school
¯nance, even in the community with good public schools.
JEL classi¯cation: I22, H72, D72
Keywords: education, centralisation, private schools, majority voting.
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1 1 Introduction
In industrialised economies, education is an eminently political topic. Since the fate of
these countries in a globalised world depends upon the skills of their labour forces, the
design of education policies has received increasing attention in recent decades. Recent
test score results from large international studies such as TIMSS and PISA have made
great impact in most countries and intensi¯ed discussions about political reforms.
Among the questions which are sometimes hotly debated is whether public education
should be provided by local or central governments. It is interesting to note that the in-
volvement of central government in education policy varies greatly even among relatively
similar countries. For instance, the share of central government funds towards primary
and secondary education in OECD countries ranges from less than 10 percent in Switzer-
land, Canada, Germany, and the US to 90 percent or more in the Netherlands, Ireland,
Greece, Portugal and New Zealand (OECD, 2004). Explaining this variation would be an
interesting task for a positive economic theory.
The literature has mainly analysed how decentralisation can a®ect e±ciency or equity.
Important questions here are how student performance and the distribution of resources are
a®ected by decentralisation. For instance, greater accountability of local school districts
is often thought to lead to a more e±cient provision of education, and local politicians
are often considered to tailor policies more closely to the needs of their constituents. On
the other hand, central exit examinations may be an e®ective tool to improve student
achievement (JÄ urges et al., 2005). Moreover, local school ¯nance may lead to segregation
which adversely a®ects the opportunities faced by the poor.
The positive economic literature on centralisation of education ¯nance is less developed.
This paper develops such a positive model. The model is a two community model with
public and private schools, where individuals di®er by income. Public schools are ¯nanced
by income taxes within communities, and individuals are mobile between communities.
With centralised school ¯nance, both communities get the same amount of per capita
spending on schools.
While the political economy of centralising public service provision has been studied
before, the analysis reveals that the existence of private alternatives has a signi¯cant impact
on this problem. The conventional wisdom is that decentralised public spending leads to
2segregated communities, and that centralisation yields policies which are farther away from
the local median voters (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Borck, 1998). Those who bene¯t from
centralisation are the voters in the middle of the distribution while voters at the edges are
bound to lose. With a private alternative, this need not be the case. In particular, I show,
using numerical simulation with parameters calibrated to match US outcomes, that at the
contrary, it may be the poorest and richest voters who bene¯t from centralisation because
they then pay lower taxes than under decentralisation. This is due to the fact that public
education with private alternatives may result in an \ends against the middle" coalition.
Centralised ¯nance leads to relatively low taxes and spending levels, and this bene¯ts the
rich (who use private schools) and the poor who use public schools but have a relatively
low preference for education.
This paper builds on two strands of the literature. On the one hand, Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland (1997), Borck (1998), and others have analysed the
political economy of centralising public good provision. The basic result here, as alluded
to before, is that centralisation may generate positive e±ciency e®ects, yet lead to policies
which are \far away" from parts of the local electorate. There is also a growing litera-
ture on centralised versus decentralised school ¯nance. For instance, Bearse et al. (2001),
Nechyba (2003a,b) and Fernandez and Rogerson (2003), study di®erent versions of educa-
tion policies, which include local and central school ¯nance. They focus on private school
attendance, income segregation and equity and e±ciency aspects of di®erent regimes. Fer-
nandez and Rogerson (2003) study voting over di®erent ¯nance regimes in a model with
perfect sorting and a purely public school system. The present paper, on the other hand,
builds on Bearse et al. (2001) who analyse central versus local school ¯nance with private
alternatives. While they focus mainly on the e®ects on spending levels and inequality, the
present paper explicitly analyses voters' choice between regimes.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model setup, starting
with a description of the centralised equilibrium. Section 3 lays out the decentralised
equilibrium, while the voting choice between the two regimes is analysed in section 4.
Section 5 presents some results from numerical simulations. In section 6, I extend the
model to incorporate peer group e®ects. Finally, the last section concludes.
32 The model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals who di®er solely by income.
A family will be identi¯ed by its income level y which is distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function F(y). Population size is normalised to one, so average
income equals aggregate income, ¹ y =
R 1
0 ydF(y).
Families have preferences over current consumption c and and their children's future in-
come, which for simplicity is taken to equal education spending, e. There is no discounting.






1¡¾);± > 0; (1)
where 1=¾ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and education. I will
assume throughout this paper that ¾ > 1 so the elasticity of substitution is less than one.
An important implication is that the price elasticity of demand for education is smaller
than the unitary income elasticity in absolute terms.
The reason for focussing on this case is twofold. First, it follows the case examined
by, e.g., Epple and Romano (1996), Bearse et al. (2001), and Fernandez and Rogerson
(2003).1 Second and somewhat surprisingly, a decentralised equilibrium may not exist
when ¾ < 1 with the same parameters as used for the unitary equilibrium by Epple and
Romano (1996)(see Appendix A for a demonstration).
Education is provided publicly, but individuals have the choice of opting out of public
education and obtaining private education at market prices instead. Public education is
¯nanced by a proportional income tax at rate t on all incomes, while the price of private
education is normalised to one. Note that individuals who obtain private education must
¯nance public education nonetheless.
Public education can be provided by the central government or by local governments.
I assume the following sequence of events: at the ¯rst stage, individuals vote on whether
to ¯nance education centrally or locally. At the second stage, they choose their place of
residence under local ¯nance (under central ¯nance, since taxes and education spending do
1Using numerical simulations and regressions, Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) ¯nd a value of ¾ between
1.05 and 1.25, while Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003) argue that the evidence is most consistent with ¾
of about 0.6.
4not di®er between communities, residence choice is immaterial). At the third stage, taxes
and the level of public education spending are chosen by simple majority voting. Finally,
at the last stage, families decide whether to send their children to public or private school,
and if in private school, how much education to consume. The model is solved by backward
induction and I start by describing the central ¯nance equilibrium. In the next section I
characterise the local ¯nance equilibrium and ¯nally analyse the choice between regimes.










If instead, this individual purchases private education, she maximises (1) subject to the
private budget constraint c = (1 ¡ t)y ¡ e, which gives the optimal amount of private









The individual will choose private education if and only if V P > V S, and her indirect utility
will be V (t;y;E) = maxfV S(¢);V P(¢)g. Let ~ y(t;E) be the income of the voter who is just
indi®erent between public and private school attendance. Then, all families with income
y > (<)~ y send their children to private (public) school (see Epple and Romano, 1996).
The fraction of the population attending public school is then given by N = F(~ y(t;E)).
Let us now look at the centralised voting problem. An individual will maximise utility
subject to the government budget constraint:
NE = t¹ y: (4)
As shown by Epple and Romano (1996), an equilibrium may not exist since preferences
satisfy neither single-peakedness nor single crossing.2 To see why single crossing fails, con-
sider ¯gure 1. The ¯gure shows indi®erence curves V 0;V 00 in (t;E) space for two voters with
incomes y0;y00 where y00 > y0. Di®erentiating (2) and (3), the slope of such an indi®erence










0 if E < ^ E(t;y)
±(1¡t)¾
E¾y1¡¾ if E > ^ E(t;y)
; (5)
2Failure of single peakedness in this problem was already noted by Stiglitz (1974).
5where ^ E(t;y) is implicitly de¯ned by V S(t;y; ^ E(t;y)) = V P(t;y). It is easily established
that ^ E(¢) is downward sloping and increasing in y (Epple and Romano, 1996). In the range
where an individual uses public schools, the slope of the indi®erence curve is increasing
in y since ¾ > 1. This is due to the fact that the unitary income elasticity of education
demand exceeds its price elasticity. Together, these facts imply that indi®erence curves
have the shape shown in Figure 1. Since the indi®erence curves cross twice, single crossing
fails and an equilibrium cannot be shown to exist in general.3
An equilibrium, if it exists, must satisfy the necessary condition (Epple and Romano,
1996):




where yd is the income of the decisive voter, and ~ y(¢) is the voter who, given the optimal
tax rate t(yd) chosen by the decisive voter, is just indi®erent between public and private
education. The intuition is that all voters with income above ~ y choose private education
and hence vote for zero taxes; all voters with income below yd prefer a lower tax rate and
all those with income y 2 (yd; ~ y) prefer a higher tax rate than t(yd). Hence, there is no
majority for a marginal increase or decrease of spending.
There is, however, the additional problem that condition (6) is necessary but not su±-
cient for a voting equilibrium: due to the failure of single crossing, other tax rates/public
education packages may win a majority of votes against this candidate. Hence, in the nu-
merical simulations, I check by hand whether the equilibrium candidate found by solving
(6) wins against a dense grid of alternative tax rates. As Epple and Romano (1996), I ¯nd
that this is always the case in the example.
As a look ahead, consider the equilibrium tax rate under centralisation. If it is positive,
it must satisfy the condition that the slope of the decisive voter's indi®erence curve equals














where "N;E and "N;t are the elasticities of the fraction of public school attendees with
3See Gans and Smart (1996) for a general exposition of the single crossing property and its use in
majority voting models. An equilibrium does exist if one assumes that individuals choose between public
and private schools prior to voting on public provision. In this case, standard conditions imply single
peaked preferences (Nechyba, 1999).
6respect to public school spending and the income tax. Since both of these are positive,
the slope of the GBC exceeds what it would be if public school attendance were ¯xed.
Since the price elasticity of demand for education is less than one, the decisive voter's
optimal tax rate is decreasing in ¹ y and increasing in N, while the opposite holds for
public spending on education. Moreover, for given N and ¹ y the optimal tax rate and
spending are decreasing in the elasticities "N;E and "N;t. The same reasoning will hold in
the decentralised equilibrium, since once individuals have chosen their place of residence,
population is ¯xed and the voting game has the same structure as under central ¯nance.
3 Decentralised equilibrium
Consider now the model with two communities, each providing its own bundle of tax
rates and public education to its residents. Individuals are completely mobile and obtain
education at their place of residence. I assume the following sequence of events: First,
individuals choose their place of residence; second, within communities, tax rates and
public education levels are chosen by majority vote; and third, in each community, voters
choose between public and private schools and, if in private school how much schooling to
consume.
The voting game within communities has exactly the same structure as in the cen-
tralised case (since population is given at this stage). Consider now the residence choice
by individuals. Without loss of generality, suppose that t1 < t2. For community 2 to be
populated, it must be true that E2 > E1, otherwise no one would want to live there. There-
fore, suppose that we have an equilibrium where t1 < t2;E1 < E2. Note that individuals
cannot live in community 2 and go to private school since by moving to community 1 and
choosing private school they would pay lower taxes and hence be better o®. A residential
equilibrium, if it exists, must have the following properties (Bearse et al., 2001):4
4Another equilibrium candidate has all poor voters living in one community with positive spending
and all rich voters living in a zero-tax community and choosing private schools. However, as Appendix B
shows, this type of equilibrium does not exist in the numerical example. Moreover, there can be a trivial
equilibrium where both communities have identical policies and their population is characterised by the
same distribution.
7Proposition 1 All individuals with y0 < y < y00 live in community 2 and send their
children to public school; all individuals with y < y0 live in community 1 and choose public
























The equilibrium is depicted graphically in Figure 1. The ¯gure shows indi®erence curves
of the two individuals who are just indi®erent between community 1 and 2, denoted C1
and C2. Individual y0 is just indi®erent between choosing public school in community 1
or 2; her indi®erence curve is labelled V 0. Note that utility is increasing in south-eastern
direction. Therefore, all individuals with y0 < y < y00 have steeper indi®erence curves and
prefer to live in community 2 and choose public school, while all individuals with income
y < y0 have °atter indi®erence curves and live in community 1 and choose public school
there. Individual y00 with indi®erence curve V 00 is indi®erent between choosing public school
in community 2 and living in community 1 and choosing private school; therefore, since
^ E(t;y) is increasing in y, all families with y > y00 live in community 1 and also choose
private school.
In the computational model, I will use the following procedure to ¯nd an equilibrium
(see also Bearse et al., 2001): (i) select income levels y0;y00 and then assign each jurisdiction
the population corresponding to the income intervals as described in Proposition 1, (ii)
given this, solve for the voting equilibrium within each jurisdiction as described in the
previous section, then check whether the population actually sorts into jurisdictions as
prescribed in step (i); if not, repeat until an equilibrium is found.
4 Voting on centralisation
Consider now the choice between central and local education ¯nance. Denote a voter's
indirect utility under centralisation by V C and the indirect utility in the decentralised








Figure 1: Decentralised equilibrium
Who will bene¯t from centralisation? The conventional wisdom on the political econ-
omy of centralisation is that it bene¯ts the middle class at the expense of rich and poor
voters (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Borck, 1998). The reason is that in models without
private alternatives to local public goods, local policies lead to segregated equilibria: in a
two community model, all the rich live in one community and all the poor in the other.
Therefore, centralisation moves policy closer to voters in the middle of the distribution and
farther from those at the edges. Here, however, things are more complicated. In fact, even
the richest voters may bene¯t from centralisation.
Who bene¯ts from centralised ¯nance will depend on the equilibrium tax rates and
education spending under alternative regimes. Since in general, one cannot say anything
about the ranking of these, I will present results from numerical simulations in the next
section. Before doing so, I preview these results (which are displayed in table 1) and discuss
the intuition behind them.
In the numerical simulations, a typical result is that public education spending is sim-
ilar in the centralised equilibrium and in community 1 in the decentralised equilibrium,
with the centralised tax rate being slightly lower. A typical result is also that community
2 has higher taxes and education spending in the decentralised equilibrium than in the
centralised equilibrium. To grasp the intuition for these results, it is instructive to con-
sider the equilibrium values shown in the example in Table 1. In community 2, there is no
9private school attendance in equilibrium, and, therefore, the decisive voter has relatively
high income. Equilibrium taxes and public school spending in community 2 therefore ex-
ceed the corresponding values in the centralised equilibrium. To compare the decentralised
equilibrium in community 1 with the centralised equilibrium, note that community 1 has
a lower income of the decisive voter, which works towards a low tax rate. So does the low
percentage of public school attendance. On the other hand, lower average income works
towards a higher tax rate than under centralization. And ¯nally, the elasticities "N;E;"N;t
are positive in the centralised equilibrium while they are zero in the local equilibria. This
follows from the fact that in the decentralised equilibrium, no individual is indi®erent be-
tween public and private school in the own community. Therefore, public school attendance
is not a®ected by a marginal increase in the tax rate, for ¯xed population. This implies a
more favourable trade-o® between taxes and spending. Taken together, the equilibrium in
community 1 is characterised by a higher tax rate and somewhat lower spending than the
centralised equilibrium.
Hence, all rich voters in community 1 prefer centralisation, since they use private schools
anyway. All poor residents in community 1 likewise prefer centralisation, since they have a
preference for relatively low taxes and education spending is similar in the two regimes. On
the other hand, there are some voters in community 2 who prefer centralisation (namely,
those voters who are relatively rich and choose private school under centralisation and those
who are relatively poor and choose public school under both regimes), while the voters in
the middle of the distribution prefer decentralisation. These are voters with a relatively
high preference for education who, however, mostly do not opt for private schooling.
This result illustrates a further interesting property of publicly provided goods with
private alternatives. In particular, it may well be that rich and poor voters bene¯t from
centralised school ¯nance. In the next section I will use numerical simulations to demon-
strate the possible empirical content of this result.
10Table 1: Simulation results
ti Ei % Public ¹ yi yd
i ~ yi % Central
± = 0:0204;¾ = 1:54;¹ = 3:36;v = 0:68
Nation 0.051 2.100 88.04 36.278 23.404 64.084 56.39
Community 1 0.052 2.071 80.92 32.106 13.736 NA 100.00
Community 2 0.072 2.858 100.00 39.652 36.620 NA 21.12
¾ = 1:34;v = 0:68
Nation 0.039 1.548 90.93 36.278 24.631 71.429 51.92
Community 1 0.040 1.551 81.58 31.776 13.016 NA 100.00
Community 2 0.051 1.984 100.00 39.094 35.533 NA 21.83
¾ = 1:54;v = 0:75
Nation 0.049 2.158 86.44 38.140 22.197 65.710 59.55
Community 1 0.051 2.152 80.83 34.302 13.472 NA 100.00
Community 2 0.072 3.033 100.00 42.053 38.879 NA 18.30
5 Simulation
5.1 Baseline results
In this section, I simulate the model numerically. Following Epple and Romano (1996),
I use the following parameters for the utility function: ± = 0:0204;¾ = 1:54. Income is
measured in 1,000s and the distribution is assumed to be lognormal: lny » N(¹;v). For
the benchmark case, ¹ = 3:36 and v = 0:68 which gives mean income ¹ y = 36;278 and
median 28;789. The parameters were chosen by Epple and Romano (1996) to yield key
outcomes which closely match those observed in the US { in particular, public education
spending and private school attendance.5 I use the same parameters here to show that
the result alluded to in the previous section actually obtains under `reasonable' parameter
values.6
5As an aside, this result of the calibration exercise assumes central school ¯nance. Indeed, under local
¯nance, equilibrium values will di®er from those actually observed.
6Bearse et al. (2001) also obtain the same ranking of equilibrium taxes and spending using di®erent
parameters.





Figure 2: Preferences for central education ¯nance
The simulation results are displayed in the upper part of Table 1. In the decentralised
equilibrium, 55% of the population live in community 2 and send their children to public
school. In community 1, 19% of all families choose private schools. This is higher than
the 12% choosing private schools under centralisation (though in absolute terms, of course,
more people use private school under centralisation). The decentralised equilibrium yields
better public education and higher taxes than the centralised equilibrium for community 2,
while community 1 residents realise higher taxes and lower public education expenditures
than under the centralised equilibrium.
Obviously everyone in community 1 prefers centralisation. In community 2, voters get
better education in the decentralised equilibrium but at a much higher tax rate. Conse-
quently, some voters are better o® under centralisation (the relatively rich and poor) but
most (79 %) prefer the decentralised equilibrium. In this example, the majority of the
national population (56 %) prefer centralisation, but for other parameters (not displayed
here) an overall majority of voters may prefer decentralisation.
Figure 2 shows the preferences for centralised against decentralised education. This
nicely illustrates the previous section's ¯nding. In particular, centralisation bene¯ts the
rich and poor against the middle class. This is, of course, due to the failure of single
crossing.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
The model generates political support for centralised education policies as a function of its
parameters, in particular, the elasticity of substitution, 1=¾, the preference parameter ±
12and the moments of the income distribution, ¹ and v. It is therefore of interest to analyse
how changing those parameters a®ects the support for centralisation.
This section presents experiments on the variation of ¾ and v. The latter is directly
related to a change in the skewness of the distribution: increasing v will make the distrib-
ution less equal by decreasing the relation between median and mean income. The results
are in the second and third part of Table 1.
Lowering ¾ to 1.34 decreases individuals' optimal tax rates, other things equal. This
can be seen in the ¯rst column of the middle part of Table 1. Although tax rates are
lower, the lower ¾ works to favour public education so that, in equilibrium, private school
attendance is lower than with ¾ = 1:54. Unlike in the previous example, local public
education spending in community 1 is now higher than central spending. However, this
di®erence is not large enough to induce any community 1 voter to prefer decentralisation.
The percentage vote share for centralisation in community 2 increases somewhat, but,
since a larger fraction of the population now live in community 2, the overall vote share
for centralisation actually falls.
Increasing v increases inequality: while median income stays the same, the increased
variance increases mean income. Other things equal, this would decrease individually opti-
mal tax rates (since ¾ > 1) and increase the individually optimal level of public education.
The combined e®ect is to increase private school attendance under centralisation. Public
spending rises both under central and local ¯nance, and rises most in community 2 under
local ¯nance. As a result, community 2 voters are now less favourable to centralisation. But
since community 2 is smaller than with v = 0:68, the percentage of votes for centralisation
in the entire voting population rises.
6 Peer group e®ects
An important feature of education is the existence of peer group e®ects. Indeed, there
is strong evidence that the quality of education depends not only on resources spent but
also on the abilities of fellow students, or peers. Therefore, I now introduce peer group
externalities in a simple way. In particular, I assume that average peer quality in a school
13type is given by the average income of the school's families.7 At ¯rst sight one might
expect that this reinforces the results. In particular, suppose for the sake of the argument
that the partition of individuals into communities and private and public schools as well
as taxes and spending were to remain una®ected. Then, individuals in the public school
in community 1 would gain from the improved peer quality if they were to share public
schooling with the richer individuals using public schools in community 2. These, however,
would lose even more from centralisation since their average peer quality would drop. But
the general equilibrium e®ects are more complicated since one has to account for di®erences
in spending, private school attendance and community composition. As it turns out, the
general equilibrium e®ects imply somewhat di®erent results.
Educational quality is now assumed to be a multiplicative function of per capita spend-
ing and peer quality. Hence, education in public and private schools under central provision
are given by (the expressions for local ¯nance are analogous):
e
P = e¹ y
µ





S = E¹ y
µ
S; ¹ yS ´
Z ~ y
0
ydF(y)=(1 ¡ F(~ y)); (11)
where µ ¸ 0 is a parameter measuring the productivity e®ect of peer quality, and ~ y, the
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p ; b ´ a
1¡¾ + ±¹ y
(1¡¾)µ
p : (12)
Note that the assumption here is that in private school, all individuals bene¯t from the
same level of peer quality, even though they obtain di®erent levels of education. That is,
richer individuals obtain the same peer quality for each hour of education although they
purchase more hours. In essence, I neglect the possibility that peer quality per hour might
depend on exactly how many hours of education di®erent individuals obtain. For instance,
7There are several reasons for this assumption (see,e.g, Nechyba, 2003a): ¯rst and foremost, parental
income and child ability are correlated; second, higher income parents may monitor schools more closely;
and third, high income parents may contribute privately to public school budgets. According to the
empirical estimates of Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), the correlation between fathers' and sons'
income is approximately 0.4.
14Table 2: Simulation with peer e®ects




Nation 0.051 2.100 88.04 NA NA 56.39
Community 1 0.052 2.071 80.92 NA NA 100.00
Community 2 0.072 2.858 100.00 NA NA 21.12
µ = 0:1
Nation 0.045 1.898 85.76 27.563 88.761 60.92
Community 1 0.046 1.988 77.94 15.457 97.191 100.00
Community 2 0.064 2.501 100.00 38.911 NA 23.98
µ = 0:2
Nation 0.040 1.720 83.39 26.711 84.315 65.90
Community 1 0.041 1.891 75.03 15.791 91.120 100.00
Community 2 0.057 2.184 100.00 38.136 NA 28.03
Note: Other parameters are: ± = 0:0204;¾ = 1:54;¹ = 3:36;v = 0:68.
one might think of a positive learning environment created by the peer group of a school,
which is the same for all pupils regardless of how many hours together with which other
pupils they go to school.
All the general results of the previous analysis still go through; what does change is the
quantitative e®ect of central versus local ¯nance, since there is now an additional impact
on educational qualities via peer e®ects.
The simulation results with peer e®ects are displayed in table 2. The ¯rst part repro-
duces the benchmark simulation, which corresponds to the case µ = 0:0. The table shows
that the overall percentage of voters in favour of centralisation increases as peer e®ects
become more important. Thus, with strong peer group e®ects, central school ¯nance is
more likely to be politically feasible. Moreover, the percentage of voters who favour cen-
tralisation rises even in community 2, despite the fact that peer quality for these voters
is lower when under centralisation they share public schools with the poor community 1
individuals. Part of the answer for this result lies in the fact that private school attendance
rises with the importance of peer e®ects. This is natural since it is the richer individuals
15who use private school, and, hence, the attractiveness of private schools rises with the im-
portance of peer e®ects. Therefore, the share of community 2 individuals who use private
school under centralisation rises as well. These individuals then prefer the central alloca-
tion with relatively low taxes, where they can take advantage of the higher peer quality in
private schools. This shows the importance of general equilibrium e®ects which often seem
to be neglected in political discussions.
7 Conclusion
The present paper has examined the political economics of central versus local school
¯nance. The main message is that when one considers private schools as alternatives to
public schools, some unexpected results may emerge. In particular, I have used numerical
simulations (with parameters calibrated to yield results which match key US outcomes)
to show that it may be the rich and poor who are most likely to bene¯t from centralised
¯nancing. The poor because they may obtain better education at low taxes, the rich
because they prefer lower taxes since they use private schools anyway.
In a model with income-related peer group e®ects, political support for central school
¯nance rises with the importance of these peer e®ects in the numerical simulations. Some
poor individuals gain because there is less segregation in public schools under central
¯nance. Some relatively rich individuals who use public school under local ¯nance also
gain because they use private schools with higher peer quality under central ¯nance.
The paper has analysed one particular form of education ¯nance, namely pure local
versus pure central ¯nance. An interesting extension would be to study alternative ¯nance
systems such as the power equalising schemes analysed by Fernandez and Rogerson (2003).
Another interesting extension would be to allow for a dynamic evolution of incomes, since
then segregation may lead to self reinforcing inequality, and studying the e®ects of di®erent
¯nance regimes would lead to interesting e®ects (see Bearse et al., 2001).
16Appendix
A Nonexistence of equilibrium with ¾ < 1
In this section, I brie°y discuss the problem of non-existence of equilibrium when ¾ < 1
(Hansen and Kessler, 2001, prove non-existence of a strati¯ed equilibrium in a model
without private alternatives). Recall that in this case optimal tax rates are non-increasing
in income. Therefore, if, say, t1 < t2;E1 < E2, there will be an individual ^ y such that all
y > ^ y live in community 1 and all y < ^ y live in community 2 (Epple and Romano, 1996).
However, with the parameters used in the baseline example for the income distribution, it
can be shown that no equilibrium of such a type can be found.
To see why, note ¯rst that given that preferences with ¾ < 1 satisfy the single crossing
property, for a given partition of the population into communities, within each community
the median income earner is decisive. Suppose then that as in section 5, we have the
following parameters: ¹ = 3:36;v = 0:68; additionally, as in Epple and Romano (1996),
let ± = 0:1111 and ¾ = 0:79. Take an equilibrium candidate partition, say, ^ y = 34:000.
The median incomes are given by ym
1 = 50:817;ym
2 = 20:089, and the means by ¹ y1 =
60:109; ¹ y2 = 20:166. As can be seen, the distribution in the rich community 1 is much
more skewed than in the poor community 2. But, with ¾ < 1, a voter's optimal tax
rate is a decreasing function of y=¹ y (given public school attendance rates). As a result,
the median voter in community 1 has a higher preference for public education than the
median in community 2. We therefore ¯nd that with this partition, the preferred tax rates
of the median income earners satisfy t(ym
1 (^ y); ¹ y1(^ y)) > t(ym
2 (~ y); ¹ y1(^ y)), which violates the
necessary condition for existence of an equilibrium. Proceeding likewise over a dense grid
of possible partitions, it can be shown that an equilibrium does not exist.
B Nonexistence of equilibrium with t1 = 0
A possible candidate for an equilibrium is a situation where all rich individuals live together
in community 1 and use private schools, while all poor individuals live in community 2
and use public schools. However, as in the preceding subsection, it turns out that no
such equilibrium exists. Suppose we take the same parameters as in the baseline model:
17¾ = 1:54;± = 0:0204;¹ = 3:36;v = 0:68. If t1 = 0 and t2;E2 > 0, it is indeed the case that
there is an income level ^ y such that all y > (<)^ y live in community 1(2).
Suppose we exogenously ¯x ^ y = 35:000. The decisive voter in community 2 has income
ym
2 = 20:412 and { given that all individuals there go to public school { an optimal tax rate
of t2 = 0:074. Computing the utility di®erence between communities for all individuals,
we ¯nd an indi®erent voter with income y = 20:549 < ^ y. Proceeding likewise over a dense
grid of possible partitions, it can again be shown that no equilibrium exists.
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